The theme of crisis, and consequently of crisis response, has been extensively studied within the disciplines of crisis communication (see Rachfał (2013a) for an overview of crisis communication as an independent academic discipline and its place among other allied subdisciplines of public relations) and public relations with the aim of protecting organisations or reducing the damage caused by a crisis episode (Fediuk, Pace and Botero, 2010) . Nowadays, with the growing recognition of crisis response as persuasive communication there is a need for an interdisciplinary approach which would help researchers understand the effects that crisis messages have on the perceptions and behaviours of stakeholders. Therefore, this paper seeks to bridge the aforementioned disciplines and examines crisis from the perspective of linguistics. Thus, it analyses grammatical stance-marking devices (Biber, et al., 1999) , which might provide insights into how speakers manipulate linguistic resources for persuasive purposes. The paper focuses on explicit stance attribution and explores how the first-person plural pronoun we is used in crisis response to alter the stakeholders' perceptions concerning people and events. The analysis draws on statements issued in 2011 by people in top public positions in the wake of the phone-hacking scandal at the News of the World.
Introduction
When I first became interested in the theme of crisis I found that it was studied both by several allied disciplines within public relations and also by a range of independent disciplines, among which Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011, p.15 ) enumerate psychology, sociology, business, mathematics and physics, and political science. Each discipline has worked out several theories which have fed crisis communication with valuable insights. Table 1 below is an extended version of Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger's (2011, p.15) table and it features the disciplines and the concomitant theories. The variety of disciplines notwithstanding, I was struck by the fact that the field whose name so explicitly indicates the imparting of information to people by the primary medium of language had so little to do with the linguistic analysis, instead finding such disciplines as, e.g. political science or mathematics and physics, nourishing. And so, the need for a thorough linguistic analysis of the texts that emerge in connection with crises occurred to me. Table 1 : Academic disciplines contributing to understanding of risk and crisis communication (Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2011, p.15) Discipline Theory contribution
Psychology
Mental models approach to risk and crisis communication Social amplification of risk and crisis perceptions (they provide insights into how people cognitively perceive and ultimately respond to crisis events)
Sociology
Disaster evacuation theory Social response to disasters Social and institutional networks during disasters (they deal with how to carry out evacuations during disasters and how people respond to these disasters)
Business
Organizational sensemaking theory Organizational learning theory High reliability organizational theory (they examine sensemaking processes of leadership during all phases of crisis; the role of organizational learning in response to crisis & organizational structures that represent a crisis-prepared or crisis-prone organization)
Mathematics & Physics
Chaos theory Complexity theory Sandpile/Self-organized criticality theory (they have been extensively used in the field of communication as metaphors for the disruption and self-organization produced by crisis events)
Political Science
Policy change theory and catastrophic disasters Deep security theory (they draw on complexity and network theories for policymakers to prepare and respond to crises such as terrorism)
Over time, this initial inspiration crystallised into interdisciplinary scholarly pursuits, a small number of which this article presents. It is based on an unpublished PhD dissertation (Rachfał, 2013b) which provides a detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of various aspects of all grammatical stance-marking devices (Biber, et al., 1999) and links stance with face (Goffman, 1967; Terkourafi, 2007) , showing how the former is used to perform facework in crisis communication. Admittedly, "crisis and disaster studies have become increasingly popular as scholars come to terms with the seminal nature of these events" (Seeger, et al., 2005, p.78) . Nonetheless, until recently, with the notable exception of the recent publication of Discourse and Crisis. Critical perspectives (De Rycker and Don, 2013) , most of the research into crisis has been done within the field of crisis communication or public relations and the theme has not as yet earned much academic interest from linguists. Therefore, this paper seeks to fill the gap and explores speakers' attempts to alter stakeholders' (i.e. any group of people who can affect or be affected by the behaviour of an organisation, or an individual, in a crisis 1 ) perceptions of crisis events and people implicated in them, by means of ambiguous use of linguistic resources such as grammatical stancemarking devices (Biber, et al., 1999) . Unlike most studies within crisis communication, and inspired by the Crisis Communication Messages Model (CCMs model) (Fediuk, Pace and Botero, 2010) , the present analysis draws on crisis messages rather than strategies (Ware and Linkugel, 1973; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995; Ulmer, Seeger and Sellnow, 2007) . Furthermore, it follows a rhetorical approach to crisis (Heath and Millar, 2004) which recognises its two constitutive dimensions, i.e. the actual one and the perceived one. Consequently, it appreciates the fact that it is how stakeholders assess the magnitude of a crisis (rather than what it actually is) that seems to have a decisive role in crisis resolution. Following this introductory section, which provides a brief overview of the status quo of the research on crisis, the article consists of four more sections: 1 Data, 2 Theoretical anchorage, 3 Analysis and discussion, and finally, 4 Concluding remarks. The first presents the overall composition of the corpus, with detailed data arranged in the form of a table. The second introduces Biber et al.'s (1999) model of stance (2.1) and focuses mainly on stance attribution and the grammatical forms that make the attribution of stance explicit (2.2). It winds up with a sub-section (2.3) which features the author's argument that grammatical forms with the first-person plural pronoun we cannot always be considered as explicitly attributing stance in crisis communication. Section 3 is comprised of five sub-sections, the first of which discusses clear, unambiguous cases of the use of the first-person plural pronoun we (3.1); the next three sub-sections (3.2-3.4) identify different types of ambiguity that stems from the use of this pronoun; and the last one (3.5) provides a summary of the core analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the basis of the analysis of the data available.
Data
The material for the present analysis comprises texts (messages) which have surfaced in the wake of the News International phone-hacking scandal.
2
The texts in the corpus amount to approximately 11 000 words. The corpus has been divided into two sub-corpora. The first one (C1) consists of eleven resignation statements and replies to resignation statements. It amounts to 5 309 words. The other one (C2), 2 see Rachfał (2013a) for an overview of the "News International Phone Hacking Scandal".
consists of four statements which are neither resignations nor replies to resignations but were made as a direct consequence of the scandal and they concern critical scandalmotivated decisions. C2 amounts to 5 650 words. All statements in the corpus (C1+ C2) have been released by the people in senior positions in the media, politics and the police in the UK who were directly, or indirectly, implicated in the events and they were issued between 21 January 2011 and 20 July 2011. Table 2 below provides an overall composition of the corpus. Biber, et al. (1999) appreciate the fact that people express stance meanings in a variety of ways, including grammatical, lexical, and paralinguistic, their approach seeks to explore grammatical stance marking as a three-dimensional phenomenon, i.e. 1) structural, 2) semantic, and 3) that of attribution of stance. Therefore, the first dimension focuses on various types of structure that are used to express stance. Those structures (grammatical stance-marking devices) have been grouped into five sets: 1) Stance adverbials, 2) Stance complement that-and to-clauses, 3) Modals and semi-modals, 4) Stance noun+ prepositional phrase, and finally 5) Premodifying stance adverb (stance adverb+ adjective/ another adverb/ numeral). Another dimension in stance is concerned with the three major semantic distinctions between the epistemic, attitudinal and style of speaking stance. This level of analysis is likely to reveal a wide range of personal meanings expressed by speakers, spanning both speakers' comments on the status of the information in a proposition, i.e. certainty (doubt), actuality, precision, or limitations, and strictly attitudinal meanings, as well as some information concerning style of speaking (Biber, et al., 1999) . Finally, the approach provides structural patterns of looking into the attribution of stance and singles out three types: explicit, implicit, and ambiguous attribution of stance. Communicating stance and in particular, attribution of stance invariably involves presenting/ revealing self and its relation to the audience -the other(s). It is so, since as Fahnestock (2011, p.279) argues, "[a]ttitudes and bids for alignment are encoded in every language choice, and the [speaker]'s presence and relation with the audience are the unerasable ground of all discourse". Probing that ground can best be done in English through examining the use of first-, second-and third-person pronouns. The article focuses solely on explicit stance attribution and in particular, it explores the ambiguity that arises from the use of the first-person plural pronoun we and how it is used to influence the stakeholders' perceptions of the crisis events and people implicated in them.
Explicit stance attribution
To ascertain the force of any stance-marking device, one needs to take into consideration whose stance is represented by a given stance marker. This brings us to the issue of stance attribution and the systematic relations between the grammatical form chosen for stance markers and the extent to which stance is attributed to the text producer (Biber, et al., 1999, p.976 (Biber, et al., 1999, p.976) . Commonly, esp. in news and fiction, all the above structures can be used with thirdperson pronouns, or full noun phrases to show that stance is attributed explicitly to a third party (Biber, et al., 1999) .
2.3 Ambiguity in explicit stance attribution As evidenced above, according to Biber, et al. (1999) all the structures with the firstperson plural pronoun we (with its possessive and objective variants) are on a par with first-person singular I in that they show that the expression of stance is in both cases attributed to the speaker. I would like to argue that in the case of crisis communication where the speakers quite frequently tend to avoid responsibility and apportion blame to other parties, or purposefully turn what is expected to be an apology for wrongdoing into an infelicitous speech act compromised in a number of ways (Kampf, 2009) , we cannot be treated as automatically marking the speaker's stance, although it certainly does in many cases. There are instances, however, which the analysis will expose, where the first-person plural pronoun we serves as an escape route which allows the speaker to downplay his/her own presence among the pronoun we referents. Consequently, explicit attribution of stance becomes a subtly powerful tool used by speakers to minimise, or on occasion avoid, commitment to the truth of the propositions framed by the stance.
Analysis and discussion
Following a short discussion of clear, unambiguous use of the first-person pronoun we in explicit stance attribution, this section is now going to examine three types of ambiguity in explicit stance attribution which arise from speakers' handling of the first-person plural pronoun we. In (3) stance expressed by the verb intend which controls the to-complement clause that follows, can be attributed to the Deputy PM and the speaker himself (the British PM), both men being the referents of the pronoun we. Even if the group of referents turns out to be larger and includes Cabinet members, generally speaking, we most likely represents the people responsible for decision-making at the governmental level in the UK. Consequently, stance referring to personal obligation and intention expressed in examples (1), (2) and (3) can be explicitly attributed to the speaker and other referents who have been fairly unambiguously introduced to the discourse. In this sense Biber et al.'s (1999) claim that the grammatical forms that make the attribution of stance explicit include we-constructions (2.2) appears to be fully grounded.
Clear cases
3.2 Ambiguous referents of the first person plural pronoun we Sub-sections 3.2-3.4 below identify three sources of ambiguity which stems from the use of the first-person plural pronoun we. The ambiguity that arises makes the explicit attribution of stance to the people represented by the pronoun we increasingly difficult, even though in each case the speaker is an inevitable referent of the pronoun. In the original statement example (3) above has immediately been preceded by the following one:
(4) Mr Speaker, we all want the same thing: press, police and politicians that serve the public ([S2] , statement to the HC on hacking scandal).
Here, it is ambiguous whose stance is being conveyed by means of the stance verb want in we all want. The determiner all (in post position) is only apparently helpful as its scope is broad enough to include: people in the world, people in Europe, people in the UK, Members of Parliament, the British government, the audience, to name just a few. Even if, as in (5) below, the speaker narrows down the group of people denoted by the pronoun we to the people representing one institution (the Met), it still remains ambiguous who exactly the speaker means, e.g. those in top positions in the Met (i.e. himself and John Yates, the Met's Assistant Commissioner -both directly implicated in the crisis) or lower rank officials, whose role in the crisis has never surfaced as the subject of police inquiry. The resolution of the matters connected with pronoun representation is of considerable importance, especially in sensitive discourses such as that of crisis response where the circumstances require precise apportioning of blame for the events in order to commence the repair process.
(5) We the Met cannot afford this -not this year ([S8], resignation statement).
Therefore, the stance expressed by the modal verb in (5) cannot be said to be explicitly attributed as the referents of the pronoun we are not clearly defined. Actually, the speaker seems to be using the pronoun we as a shield behind which he hides himself and thus avoids taking full responsibility for his decisions which have led to his resignation. Instead, the speaker is trying to justify his decision to step down as Metropolitan Police Commissioner with the well-being of the institution he represents rather than his own, which reflects itself in the pronoun used. Similarly, in examples (6) and (7) stance is apparently explicitly attributed to the group of people inclusive of the speaker but only vaguely defined. Consequently, stance expressed by will and must loses its persuasive power as it is hardly clear who obliges themselves to do more.
(6) No one should be in any doubt we will get to the bottom of the truth and learn the lessons for the future ([S2], statement to the HC on hacking scandal). (7) Operation Elveden and Lord Justice Leveson's inquiry are charged with doing just that, but I believe that we can and must do more ([S2], statement to the HC on hacking scandal).
There are numerous cases of apparently explicit attribution of stance caused by the ambiguous reference of the pronoun we. This fact reflects what Lerman (1985) calls the problem of dual identity which is present in the speech of all public figures, whose I is fused with a public role and addressed to a mass audience, or, in other words, it reflects "the discourse of the Institutional Voice, the discourse of one who speaks in a dual role, as an individual, who also represents (as the journalists do) or personifies (as the President may) an institution" (Lerman, 1985, p.185) . She further claims that the inherent paradoxes of what she dubs Institutional identity "are most apparent in non-trivial and public discourse, in which serious propositions are asserted for which the speaker is not responsible, or whose propositional structure creates a level of ambiguity which defies logical analysis" (Lerman, 1985, p.185) . Actually, all the speakers in both sub-corpora represent institutional identity, which is however, more pronounced in C2 due to the nature of the statements (Section 1). In C1, as it includes resignation statements, an individual is apparently more enhanced than an institutional identity. With this in mind, it would be quite a challenge to maintain the claim concerning the explicitness of stance attribution in cases like those above.
3.3 Ambiguous referents of the subject(s) of the proposition(s) framed by stance and expressed by means of the first person plural pronoun we Most intriguing however, and fairly numerous across the analysed messages, are the cases where stance is unambiguously attributed to the speaker, but the subject(s) of the proposition(s) framed by that stance and expressed by means of the first person plural pronoun we, has/have ambiguous reference. Examples (8), (9) and (10) (10) I wish we had managed to see and fully solve these problems earlier ([S6] , statement to the CMS Committee).
In each case above the speaker explicitly attributes stance to himself (I carry ultimate responsibility for, I wish, I acknowledge, I hope, I wish) but dilutes his own participation in the activity expressed by the verb in the proposition framed by stance, by means of the ambiguous representation of the pronoun we (we had judged, we have made mistakes, we had managed to see). The plural pronoun seems to shelter the speaker and dilutes his/her presence among other referents of the pronoun, especially considering that in most cases the proposition concerns the crisis events and exposes misjudgment or wrongdoing. Therefore, first the speakers avoid taking personal responsibility for the actions described in the propositions, and second, realising the face-threatening power of the exact representation of the pronoun we, they are vague as to who else we refers to. Furthermore, in many cases, the speakers introduce a different set of referents each time they make use of the first-person plural we. Additionally, the examples above reveal the speakers' consistent tendency to alternate their use of the first-person singular and plural pronouns for selfreference. The reason for this is that the speaker wishes to achieve certain communicative goals by conveying different persuasive messages to different people at the same time but "[p]roducing coherent statements in such situations is only possible by using various forms of indirectness or vagueness because different groups of the audience may have dissimilar (and even contradictory) wants" (Grubner, 1993, p. 3).
Ambiguity arising from the weclusivity issue
Another issue that arises in connection with the use of the first-person plural we is clusivity and how it is handled by speakers in building their relationship with audiences. In its regular use, the pronoun should be interpreted as "I in addition to one or more other persons" Lyons (1968, p.277) ; and the other persons may or may not include the hearer. If the set of other persons does include the reference to the hearer, it is customary to talk about an inclusive use of the pronoun we, if it does not, then the term exclusive is employed. Hence, we is not "the plural of I': rather, it includes a reference to I and is plural" (Lyons, 1968, p.277) .
The speakers tend to juggle with inclusive and exclusive we at will, depending on which serves their persuasive purposes better, which becomes evident when one studies longer passages from the statements of particular speakers. Example (11) below is indicative of this trend. The speaker uses the self-reference, firstperson singular pronoun I to commence his statement, which might suggest that he wants to signal to his audience(s) that he represents himself as an individual and is presenting his own subjective position. Moreover, it may be indicative of his wish to be separated from other(s) whom he later brings into the discourse. Nonetheless, right in the same sentence he fights shy of I and breaks into a run of we. In terms of pronoun use, this is a tendency that prevails throughout his statement. When says (...) and the steps we are taking to address (...), he uses exclusive we (Lyons, 1968) , which has the effect of distancing himself from his audience but more importantly, enables him to melt into the group and dissolve his responsibility for the crisis. Torode (1976) refers to such use of we as a transcendental voice and suggests that the implication is that the decisions will be taken elsewhere and at another time. In example (11) above, the implication might be that the steps are being taken somewhere else and in a broadly understood presence. When the speaker is saying the steps we are taking, he conjures up the idea of a group of people currently not on the scene whose deliberations will decide the matter, and for which the speaker is not fully responsible (Harré, 1985, p.138) . Following Torode (1976) , Harré (1985, p.138) sharply contrasts the use of we as a transcendental voice with the royal we, in which the speaker appears as the embodiment of the collective will. It is the user of the royal we who makes the decision there and then, and as such can be addressed. The difference is that the decision once made is announced with the majesty of the one who is the sovereign, the embodiment of people, and not with the feeble authority of the human individual. Apparently, there is no clear clue as to who else, apart from the speaker, we in example (11) encompasses. Most probably, they are the powerful at News International. The exclusive use of the first-person plural in example (11) becomes even more intriguing inasmuch as it seems to contradict the speaker's intentions expressed at the beginning of his statement, when he addresses his audience with the following words: you as colleagues at the News of the World. If the speaker were consistent in the way he uses the first-person plural we, this kind of address would only strengthen inclusiveness of the previous we. On the other hand, if we were inclusive, the speaker would not need to inform the audience about the steps being taken, they would be well-informed as part of the team, but they are not. Moreover, example (12) below (which immediately follows example (11) in the original statement) also features the first-person plural pronoun we, which on this occasion is most probably exclusive.
(12) We now have voluntarily given evidence to the police that I believe will prove that this was untrue and those who acted wrongly will have to face the consequences ([S3] , statement on closure of NOW).
The same tendency to form close alignments with the audience(s) by means of inclusive we, can be traced in the statements of other speakers as well. The only difference being their treatment of the plural pronoun we. (13) Unlike other speakers, the speaker in example (13) does not constantly alternate her use of the first-person singular and plural pronouns. Instead, she uses the inclusive we to create a strong sense of community with her audience at the beginning of her statement, as illustrated above, and having achieved her goal, she consequently sticks to the first-person singular pronoun I, as in (14) It is not only the spirit of community that the speaker wants to feed with the inclusive we, her handling of the pronoun reveals her attempt to apportion blame among other referents of the pronoun we in we have hurt. The first-person plural pronoun we functions here as an escape route which allows the speaker to downplay her own presence among the pronoun we referents whoever they are. Characteristically, the referents of we in we have hurt and we now know are different in terms of clusivity, the first one most likely being exclusive and the other one most probably inclusive. It does not change the fact that precise identification of the pronoun we referents is equally difficult and escapes analysis.
Findings
Section 3 primarily identifies and discusses three different reasons why the weconstructions cannot invariably be said to explicitly mark stance in crisis communication, esp. in a crisis response phase, where precise pronoun representation seems to be the condition sine qua non for crisis resolution. Although, inevitably the speaker is represented by the pronoun we, and consequently the stance can be explicitly attributed to him/her, it is the ambiguous reference to the Other(s) who are represented by the pronoun that is the issue. The analysis shows that the speakers exploit the first-person plural pronoun we in a threefold manner. First, they are unclear about other referents of the pronoun, which makes it barely possible to decide whose stance is conveyed, which renders all the intentions, obligations and promises expressed by the speakers vacuous as in fact nobody commits themselves to their fulfilment (3.2). Second, although they explicitly attribute stance to themselves by means of the first-person singular pronoun I, they are unclear in terms of the referents of the pronoun we, which functions as a subject of the proposition(s) framed by stance. This move seems to have a double pay-off for the speakers. First, they downplay their role in the actions which constitute the crisis events and which are described in the propositions. Second, they refrain from naming other referents of the pronoun for fear of committing facethreatening acts. Consequently, the stakeholders are kept in the dark about the wrongdoers but are left with the speakers' declarations of regret for acts they apparently have not committed (3.3). Finally, the speakers exploit the plural pronoun we by the expedient of juggling its clusivity, with the aim of creating a sense of community with their audience and also of making the apportioning of blame difficult (3.4).
Concluding remarks
As the present analysis is part of a larger study (see Introduction), which among other issues, comprises the analysis of explicit, implicit and ambiguous stance attribution in grammatical stance-marking devices in crisis response messages, the results should be viewed in that context. Table 3 below shows the overall distribution of explicit, implicit and ambiguous stance attribution across the corpus in all analysed grammatical stancemarking devices. Contrary to the expectations grounded in the knowledge of the strategies used by the speakers in crisis communication (Benoit, 1995) , but in accordance with the overall results, in the majority of cases, the speakers overtly attribute stance to themselves (or to a third party referred to by relevant pronouns). Thus, explicit stance attribution is most commonly used in stance complement clauses (228 instances), stance noun+ prepositional phrase constructions (19 instances) and premodifying stance adverb constructions (52 instances). Then, the second most common way to attribute stance is the implicit one, where although stance is not overt in such cases, it can easily be inferred as that of the speaker. In the corpus, the stance markers which expose the latter characteristic are adverbials (29 instances) as well as modals and semi-modals (138 instances). Finally and unexpectedly, the ambiguous attribution of stance turns out to be the least frequently used in the analysed crisis response messages (12 instances altogether). The rub is, however, that what Biber, et al. (1999) classify as explicit stance attribution loses its explicitness as a result of the speakers' ambiguous handling of the pronouns (other than the first-person singular pronoun I), particularly the firstperson plural pronoun we. Consequently, although we-constructions are classified as explicitly attributing stance, they testify to the fact that adroit attribution of stance in crisis response messages becomes one of the powerful persuasive devices in crisis communication.
Although the present study provides insights into how speakers manipulate explicit stance attribution for persuasive purposes, the fact that it lacks perception data that would incorporate the stakeholders' assessment of the statements renders it somewhat subjective and may be perceived as a limitation of this study. Compensating for this absence could be a challenge for future research in the field.
